When the FAA introduced ADS-B (Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast) as part of its NextGen modernization push, the goal was noble: improve traffic separation, enable more efficient routing, and enhance safety across the National Airspace System. Every aircraft would continuously broadcast its position, velocity, and identity, creating a real-time picture of traffic in the skies. A revolution in air traffic awareness.

But even back then, a small voice in the back of every aircraft owner’s head whispered, “Wait… all of this data is public?” And so it was—and is. Anyone with a basic receiver and a Wi-Fi connection could track your every hop, skip, and $200 hamburger run. And if they wanted your name and address? That was just a lookup away.

The Problem: When Good Tech Goes Creepy

ADS-B was never meant to be a surveillance tool for fee collectors or litigious neighbors, but that’s what it became in some cases.

Let’s break it down:

• Third-party companies like Vector Airport Systems started using ADS-B data to track aircraft landings and send automated invoices for landing fees—even for low approaches or touch-and-goes where no fee would traditionally apply.
• Other parties have used the pairing of ADS-B and public registry data to sue pilots, alleging “nuisance” or “trespass” just because a flight passed overhead—perfectly legal, perfectly within regulations.
• And of course, the headlines. Celebrities and public figures like Elon Musk and Taylor Swift found their every flight meticulously logged and broadcasted by online flight trackers using the public FAA registry and ADS-B feeds.

The intended safety and efficiency benefits of ADS-B were now being undermined by privacy intrusions and weaponized transparency.

The Problem: When Transparency Enables Unintended Use

The implementation of ADS-B was intended to enhance safety and situational awareness by making aircraft position data freely available. However, the public nature of ADS-B broadcasts, combined with the FAA’s publicly searchable aircraft registry, has enabled secondary uses of this data far beyond the scope of air traffic management.

Use in Landing Fee Enforcement

One prominent example involves third-party airport billing services, such as Vector Airport Systems, which use ADS-B data to track aircraft operations and automatically generate invoices for landing fees. Aircraft owners have reported receiving landing fee invoices after performing:

• low approaches,
• touch-and-go operations,
• or even overflights where no actual landing occurred.

These fees are often based solely on inferred landing data from ADS-B sources, not confirmed FBO or tower records. AOPA has raised concerns that this practice contradicts the intended scope of ADS-B and places an administrative burden on aircraft owners who must dispute erroneous charges.

Civil Litigation and Data Exposure

In other cases, ADS-B data has been used as evidence in civil disputes. Property owners have tracked overhead aircraft via public ADS-B feeds and registration databases and filed lawsuits alleging “nuisance,” “trespass,” or other tort claims. These suits, while often unsuccessful, highlight how real-time flight visibility and owner identification can be used to initiate legal action against pilots operating entirely within regulated airspace.

Additionally, online platforms that aggregate ADS-B data—such as ADS-B Exchange and FlightAware—have allowed any individual to correlate an aircraft’s N-number with owner identity, facilitating data scraping and targeted outreach. Some entities have used this capability for unsolicited marketing, enforcement notices, or activist tracking.

Advocacy Response

Organizations such as AOPA and NBAA have petitioned the FAA to limit the accessibility of ownership data, noting that its combination with ADS-B tracking introduces risks to safety, security, and operational integrity. As AOPA noted in a letter to the FAA:

“We are concerned with the unintended consequences of making this data public and how it may be used in ways that go far beyond the FAA’s intended scope.”

These concerns have directly contributed to the policy shift introduced in March 2025.

The FAA’s New Privacy Shield

Enter the FAA’s March 2025 ruling, powered by Section 803 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024: a new process that allows aircraft owners to withhold personally identifiable information (PII) from public FAA records.

According to the FAA’s official site:

“The FAA now allows aircraft owners to request that their name, address, phone number, and email be withheld from public dissemination. This data will still be accessible to appropriate FAA personnel, but not to the general public.”

Submitting a request is now as easy as logging into the CARES portal, checking a box, and hitting submit. And yes—it’s free.

This move is more than symbolic. It severs the link between an aircraft’s ADS-B broadcast and a publicly identifiable owner, making it harder for third parties to exploit that connection for unintended (and often unwelcome) purposes.

As AOPA writes in their April 2025 coverage:

“This is a significant win for general aviation pilots and aircraft owners. We’ve been advocating for years that publicly available registration data, when paired with ADS-B tracking, created unnecessary safety and privacy risks.”

What I’m Doing

As for me—my Sling TSi is already registered with its N-number, and while it’s not yet officially in the FAA registry (because the final airworthiness and registration process will happen after the build), I fully plan to submit a privacy request as soon as I’m eligible.

And if you’re an owner or soon-to-be-owner like me, I recommend you do the same:

1. Log into the FAA CARES system.
2. Navigate to your aircraft record (once registered).
3. Submit a request to withhold your PII from the public registry.

It’s a small step that puts you back in control of your own narrative. The skies may be public, but your mailbox doesn’t have to be.